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Abstract—Admission practices at high-profile universities are often crit-
icized for undermining academic merit. Popular tests for detecting such
biases suffer from omitted characteristic bias. We develop a bounds-based
test to circumvent this problem. We assume that students who are better
qualified on observables would, on average, appear academically stronger to
admission officers based on unobservables. This assumption reveals the sign
of differences in admission standards across demographic groups that are
robust to omitted characteristics. Applying our methods to admissions data
from a British university, we find higher admission standards for men and
slightly higher ones for private school applicants, despite equal admission
success probability across gender and school background.
I. Introduction
ADMISSION practices at selective universities generateconsiderable public interest and political controversy
due to their close connection with intergenerational mobility
and social discrimination. For example, in the United King-
dom, a highly publicized 2011 Sutton Trust report shows
that nationally just 3% of schools—mostly expensive and
independent (as opposed to state-run) institutions—account
for 32% of undergraduate admissions to Oxford and Cam-
bridge, while these universities claim to admit solely on
the basis of academic merit. Background-based admission
quotas such as caste-based reservation in India and race-
based affirmative action in the United States have generated
intense public controversy. Despite significant public interest
in these issues, rigorous methods for modeling and testing
the “fairness” of admissions based on empirical evidence are
absent in the academic literature. In this paper, we develop
an empirical framework to model meritocracy of admission
decisions and use it to infer whether all applicants are held
to the same academic standard during admissions.
A simple approach to detecting discrimination in admis-
sions, popular in the education literature, is to test if
demographic or socioeconomic characteristics of applicants
are significant determinants of admission, after controlling
for commonly observed academic records such as past test
scores (Espenshade, Chung, & Walling, 2004; Zimdars &
Heath, 2009; Hurwitz, 2011). However, if admission offi-
cers observe more indices of academic ability than the
researcher, and the relation between observable and unob-
servable indices varies by demographics, then these naive
tests become invalid (Heckman, 1998). For instance, if
female candidates ceteris paribus perform better on inter-
views and interview scores are unobserved by a researcher,
then an equal admission rate of observationally similar male
and female candidates implies bias against female appli-
cants. Indeed, in the empirical context investigated in this
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paper, we find that socioeconomic backgrounds do not have
statistically significant effects on admission rates once we
control for preadmission test and interview scores. However,
applying a more careful analysis that addresses the omitted
characteristic problem, we find that male candidates face a
higher admission threshold than female candidates and that
differences in thresholds across type of school attended by
the applicant are less significant.
Beyond their obvious legal and political significance, such
findings also have important policy implications. For exam-
ple, knowing that one has to admit weaker female students to
maintain gender balance in application success rates raises
questions about what investments are needed at the school
level to improve the quality of female applicants. Naive sat-
isfaction with gender equality in admission success would
conceal this important role for potential interventions.
Methodologically, our approach to bias detection is related
to the productivity-based view of optimal decisions in the tra-
dition of Becker (1957). Viewed in this light, if admissions
are purely meritocratic, then the marginal admitted student
from a state school should be expected to perform equally
well in postadmission assessments (e.g., college exams) as
the marginal student admitted from a private school, but
her expected performance would be worse under affirma-
tive action. Conversely, taste-based discrimination against
state schools will lead to the marginal state school admitted
student to perform better than the marginal candidate admit-
ted from an independent school. The difference between
expected performances of marginal candidates across demo-
graphic groups can therefore be interpreted as a measure of
deviation from meritocracy.
A challenge in implementing this approach directly is that
a researcher typically observes a subset of the applicant
characteristics used by admissions officers, and the distri-
butions of the unobserved characteristics may, and usually
do, differ across demographic groups. This “omitted char-
acteristics” problem jeopardizes the researcher’s attempt at
reconstructing the decision maker’s perceptions and identi-
fying the marginal admits, and therefore assessing whether
the decision maker acted in an academically unbiased way.
Problems of this type have been recognized by previous
researchers in the context of detecting taste-based discrimi-
nation in hiring (Heckman, 1998). In this paper, we devise a
test for meritocratic admissions—based on the differences
in admission thresholds faced by different demographic
groups—that, under appropriate assumptions, is robust to
the omitted characteristics problem.
Specifically, we construct an empirical, threshold-crossing
model of admissions involving observed applicant covari-
ates and unobserved heterogeneity—applicant characteris-
tics observed by admission, officers, but unobserved by the
researcher. In our model, academic fairness corresponds to
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using identical thresholds of expected future performance
across applicants from different demographic groups. Our
key assumption, for which we will provide supporting empir-
ical evidence, is that students who are significantly better in
terms of easily observable indicators of academic potential
should statistically—but not necessarily with certainty—be
more likely to appear stronger to the admission officer, based
on characteristics observed by her but not by the researcher.
The distribution of unobservables, conditional on observ-
ables, is otherwise allowed to be arbitrarily different across
demographic groups. We show that by using this assump-
tion in conjunction with pre- and postenrollment data, one
can learn about the sign of the differences between admission
thresholds applied to different demographic groups.
We use our methods to analyze admissions data from a
selective U.K. university on applicants who have cleared
an initial exam-based elimination round. We first provide
evidence in support of our identifying assumption; we then
apply our methods to show that male applicants face a higher
admission standard than females,1 whereas standards faced
by private school applicants are possibly slightly higher than
those faced by state school applicants. In contrast, the appli-
cation success rates are very similar across gender and type
of school attended by the candidate, both before and after
controlling for key covariates, thereby illustrating the crux
of our approach.
A large volume of research exists in educational statistics
on the analysis of admissions to selective colleges, focusing
mainly on the United States (Hoxby, 2009). In this context,
our goal is to assess the extent of meritocracy in prevalent
admission practice by focusing on the marginal admits in dif-
ferent demographic groups. This enables us to demonstrate
empirically that equal success rates in admissions across
demographic groups can be consistent with very differ-
ent admission standards across these different groups. (See
Sander, 2004, for an early discussion of these issues in the
context of U.S. law school admissions.) This is in contrast to
many other studies, both academic and policy oriented, that
compare either average preadmission test scores (Herrnstein
& Murray, 1994) or average postadmission performance
across all (as opposed to marginal) admitted students from
different socioeconomic groups (Keith et al., 1985; Waters
et al., 2009; Kane, 1998).
Our paper also complements an existing literature on
analyzing the consequences of affirmative actions in col-
lege admissions. Fryer and Loury (2005) provide a critical
review of the relevant theoretical literature. On the empirical
side, Arcidiacono (2005) uses a structural model of admis-
sions to simulate the potential counterfactual consequences
of removing affirmative action in U.S. college admission;
Card and Krueger (2005) describe the reduced-form impact
1 As a referee has pointed out, it remains possible that some academically
stronger female candidates were erroneously eliminated in the first round;
had they been retained, the gender gap may have appeared narrower.
of eliminating affirmative action on minority students’ appli-
cation behavior in California, and Hinrichs (2012) examines
the effects of banning preferential admission policies on
enrollment patterns of both minority and nonminority stu-
dents. Arcidiacono and Lovenheim (2015) provide a review
of the empirical evidence on the effect of affirmative action
on student-college mismatch. This paper, though substan-
tively related to the work we identified, has a different
goal. Here, we construct a formal econometric model where
affirmative action (or taste-based discrimination) and meri-
tocracy have different empirical implications, and we use it
in conjunction with admissions-related microdata to detect
deviations from meritocracy. To our knowledge, the only
other work in this literature that focuses on marginal admits
is Bertrand, Hanna, and Mullainathan (2010), who examined
the consequences of affirmative action in admission to an
Indian college. In their setting, admission was based on score
in a single entrance exam; admission thresholds differed by
applicants’ social caste and were publicly announced. This
setup removes a key empirical challenge—that of defining
and identifying the marginal admits and rejects—arising in
general admissions contexts where entrance is based on sev-
eral background variables, there is unobserved heterogeneity
across applicants, and admission thresholds are not explicitly
announced. Our context requires us to deal with this more
general scenario.
Although this paper focuses on the issue of college admis-
sions, the general methodology is applicable to many other
settings of testing bias in institutional decision making.
Common examples include approval of business loan and
mortgage applications, referrals to expensive surgery ver-
sus cheaper medicine-based treatment, and hiring decisions.
The data setting is one where a researcher has access to
key characteristics of individual applicants and the even-
tual decision made on their behalf by the approval agency.
These key characteristics need not be exhaustive, and this
paper’s methodology allows the possibility that approvers
may observe a richer set of applicant characteristics than the
researcher does. Applying our methods, one can then test
whether the observed data are consistent with meritocratic
approval processes, for example, that all loan applicants face
a common ceiling of default probability below which the
application is approved, or that each patient has to clear the
same hurdle of expected survival days following the surgery
in order to qualify for the procedure.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section
II sets up a simple theoretical model, followed by the
corresponding empirical model of meritocratic admissions.
Section III describes the data. Section IV states the assump-
tions, provides empirical evidence in support of the key
identifying assumption, and lays out the identification anal-
ysis. Section V discusses inference. Section VI reports the
empirical findings from the real data set, presents robustness
checks, and discusses some caveats. Section VII concludes.
An online appendix contains the basic economic model of
optimal admissions (part A), some additional figures and
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tables relevant to robustness checks (B.1 and B.2), the result
of a simulation exercise based on the real data (part B.3),
and formulas for calculating the confidence intervals for
threshold differences (part C).
II. Benchmark Optimization Model
In the online appendix, part A, we lay out a benchmark
economic model of admissions to help fix ideas. Based on
this economic model, we develop a corresponding econo-
metric model incorporating unobserved heterogeneity, which
can be used for admissions data. The basic elements of the
economic model are as follows.
Let W denote an applicant’s preadmission characteris-
tics, observed by the university. Let φ (w) denote a w-type
student’s expected outcome (e.g., expected future GPA) if
he or she enrolls, and let α (w) denote the probability that
a w-type student, on being offered admission, eventually
enrolls. Let c ∈ (0, 1) be the fraction of applicants who
can be admitted, given the number of available spaces. If
the university wishes to maximize total performance of the
incoming cohort subject to the restriction on the number of
vacant places, then its admission strategy would be to admit
individuals whose φ (w) ≥ γ, where γ is chosen to satisfy
the budget constraint. The key feature of this rule is that γ
does not depend on covariates, and so the value of an appli-
cant’s W affects the decision on his or her application only
through its effect on φ (W). To get some intuition on this,
consider the case where one of the covariates in W is gen-
der, and assume that the admission threshold for women,
γfemale, is strictly lower than that for men, γmale. Then the
marginal female, admitted with w = (x, female), contributes
γfemale × α (x, female) to the expected aggregate outcome
and takes up α (x, female) places, implying a contribution of
γfemale (= α (x, female) γfemale/α (x, female)) to the objective
of average realized outcome. Similarly, the marginal rejected
male, if admitted, would contribute γmale to the average out-
come. Since γmale > γfemale, we can increase the average
outcome if we replace the marginal female admit with the
marginal male reject. Thus, different thresholds cannot be
consistent with the objective of maximizing the overall out-
come. Our goal is to use actual admissions data to understand
whether admission officers use identical thresholds across
sociodemographic groups. The key challenge is to allow for
the possibility that admission-officers’ inference about aca-
demic merit were based on more characteristics than the
researchers observe, so that one cannot infer the admission
thresholds simply based on observed characteristics. We now
turn to the task of constructing an econometric model incor-
porating unobserved heterogeneity in an empirical model of
admissions.
A. Econometric Model
To set up the empirical framework, let W := (X, G),
where G denotes one or more discrete components of W
capturing the group identity of the applicant (such as sex,
race, or type of high school attended), which forms the basis
of commonly alleged mistreatment. The variables in X are
the applicant’s other characteristics observed prior to admis-
sion, which include one or more continuously distributed
components like standardized test scores. We observe the
covariates X, G and the binary admission outcome D (= 1 if
admitted and = 0 otherwise). Let Xg, Xh denote the support
of X for applicants of type G = g and G = h, respectively.
Let Z denote an index of academic ability of applicants,
based on “soft” characteristics, such as evidence of enthusi-
asm and academic reference letters, which are unobservable
to the analyst but observed by the admission officer. This
may also include any random idiosyncrasies in the officers’
expectation formation process.2 We assume that larger val-
ues of Z , without loss of generality, denote higher perceived
academic potential.
Under meritocratic admissions, admission officers would
decide on whether to admit applicant i in the current year,
based on φ (Xi, Gi, Zi), their subjective assessment of i’s
academic merit (e.g., how applicant i will perform when
admitted).3 In accordance with our economic model, we
assume that applicant i with Gi = g, Zi = z, and Xi =
x ∈ Xg is offered admission (i.e., Di = 1) if and only if
φ (x, g, z) ≥ γ, where γ denotes the university-wide baseline
threshold for applicants—that is,
Di =
{
1 if φ (Xi, Gi, Zi) ≥ γ;
0 otherwise.
(1)
An admission practice is academically fair if and only if γ
does not vary by demographics. The underlying intuition is
that the only way covariates G should influence the admis-
sion process is through their effect on the perceived academic
merit. Having a larger γ for, say, women than men implies
that a male applicant with the same expected outcome as a
female applicant is more likely to be admitted. Conversely,
under affirmative action policies, γ will be lower for demo-
graphics that represent historically disadvantaged groups.
Therefore, we are interested in testing whether the values
of the threshold γ are identical across demographics. We
will call γ the admission threshold.
Thus, a female applicant with identical X as a male candi-
date can have a higher probability of being admitted, and yet
the admission process may be academically fair if women
have a higher expected performance than men with identical
X. This notion of fairness differs from one that requires that
individuals who are identical on publicly verifiable variables
(i.e., the Xs) must have equal chances of getting in, no mat-
ter what their value of G and no matter whether predicted
future performance differs across G for the same value of X.
2 When there are multiple sources of soft information, Z may be inter-
preted as a composite scalar index (e.g., a weighted average) of these
characteristics.
3 In line with the existing literature on bias detection referenced above,
we ignore issues about risk and leave that for future research.
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Remark 1. It is important to note that we do not assume
that admission officers literally calculate expected future per-
formance in order to admit candidates. Our goal is to assess
whether the admission process, whatever its goal and how-
ever it is conducted, is consistent with the goal of admitting
the academically strongest applicants.
III. Data
Our empirical analysis is based on admissions data for two
recent cohorts of applicants to a competitive and popular
undergraduate degree program at a selective U.K. univer-
sity. Students enter British universities to study a specific
subject, rather than the U.S. model of starting a general
curriculum, followed by specialization in later years. Con-
sequently, admissions are conducted primarily by faculty
members (referred to as admission tutors) in the specific
discipline to which the candidate has applied. An appli-
cant competes with all others who apply to this specific
subject, and no switches are permitted across disciplines in
later years. The admission process is held to be strictly aca-
demic; extracurricular achievements are given no weight. In
that sense, these admissions are more comparable to Ph.D.
admissions in U.S. universities. Furthermore, almost all U.K.
applicants take two common school-leaving examinations,
the General Certificate of Secondary Education (GCSE) and
the A-levels, before entering university. Each of these exam-
inations requires the student to take written tests in specific
subjects. The examinations are centrally conducted, so the
scores of individual students are directly comparable. In
addition, all applicants take a multiple-choice aptitude test,
similar to the SAT in the United States, and write an essay
that is graded.
A. Choice of Sample
For our empirical analysis, we focus on U.K.-domiciled
applicants. The application process consists of an initial
stage whereby a standardized form, the Universities and Col-
leges Admissions Service (UCAS) is filled by the applicant
and submitted to the university. This form contains the appli-
cant’s unique identifier number, gender, school type, prior
academic performance record, personal statement, and a let-
ter of reference from the school. The GCSE, the aptitude test,
and essay scores are separately recorded. About one-third of
all applicants are then selected for interview by admission
tutors on the basis of the aptitude test. The rest are rejected.
Selected candidates are then assessed in a face-to-face inter-
view, and the interview scores are recorded centrally. This
subgroup of applicants who have been called to interview
will constitute our sample of interest. Therefore, we are in
effect testing the academic efficiency of the second round of
the selection process, taking the first round as given. Accord-
ingly, from now on, we will refer to those summoned for
interview as the applicants. The final admission decision is
made by considering all candidate-specific information from
Table 1.—Variable Label
gcsescore Overall score in GCSE, 0–4
alevelscore Average A-level scores, 80–120
aptitude test Overall score in aptitude test, 0–100
essay Score on substantive essay, 0–100
interview Performance score in interview, 0–100
prelim_avg Average score in first year university exam, 0–100
offer Whether offered admission
The gcsescore is an average of the GCSE grades achieved by the candidate for eight subjects, where
A* = 4, A = 3, B = 2, C = 1, D or below = 0. The grades used are mathematics plus the other seven best
grades. The alevelscore is an average of the A-levels achieved by or predicted for the candidate by his or
her school, excluding general studies. Scores are calculated on the scale A = 120, A/B = 113, B/A = 107,
B = 100, C = 80, D = 60, E = 40, as per England-wide UCAS norm.
among the applicants called for interviews. For our applica-
tion, we use anonymized data for two cohorts of applicants
from their records held at the central admissions database at
the university. To preserve anonymity, the data do not contain
reference letters.
B. Choice of Covariates
We chose a preliminary set of potential covariates to be the
observables, based on the information recorded on UCAS
forms and the university’s application records. We use as
observable components (i.e., X) GCSE score, aptitude test
scores, the examination essay score, and the interview score.
A more detailed description of these covariates is provided
in table 1. The unobservable index of achievement Z pertains
to information conveyed by recommendation letters. Given
that those summoned for interview constitute our population
of interest, we found that in terms of whether the applicant
previously read two subjects recommended for entry, there
is very little variation across these applicants and including
these covariates makes no difference to our eventual results.
Therefore, we eventually dropped these variables from the
analysis.
C. Group Identities G
We consider the academic efficiency of admissions with
regard to two different group identities: type of school the
applicant attended and the applicant’s gender. Selective uni-
versities in the United Kingdom are frequently criticized for
the relatively high proportion of privately educated students
admitted. The implication is that applicants from indepen-
dent schools, where spending per student is much higher
than in state schools (Graddy & Stevens, 2005), have an
unfair advantage in the admission process. This is of spe-
cial concern in a country like the United Kingdom where
most selective universities are largely funded by taxpayers.
The issue of gender differences in admission and academic
performance is, of course, a more universal issue. In the
United Kingdom, as in most other OECD countries, the
higher education participation rate is higher for women,
having overtaken that for men in 1993. However, selective
universities in the United Kingdom have lagged behind the
trend: in 2010–11, 55% of undergraduates across all U.K.
universities were women, but 44% of students admitted to
ARE UNIVERSITY ADMISSIONS ACADEMICALLY FAIR? 453
the university we are analyzing were women. Typically, gen-
der imbalances are more pronounced in certain programs and
include the one we study, where male enrollment is nearly
twice the female enrollment.
In our data set, we can also match the postadmission aca-
demic performance of admitted students to their preadmis-
sion characteristics. In principle, one can use this informa-
tion for analyzing potential bias in admissions. Allowing for
selection on unobservables, however, means that such data
cannot be used without making more restrictive assumptions.
For example, a regression of eventual academic performance
on preadmission covariates for admitted candidates does not
yield a consistent estimate of the predictive power of these
covariates for the pool of applicants, for whom the admission
decision is made. Indeed, due to classical selection bias, one
would expect such effects to be biased toward 0 (see Roth-
stein, 2004, for a discussion of related issues). A second
potential limitation of such data is that academic perfor-
mance as measured by the university’s own exams may not
be the sole index of academic ability sought by an admis-
sion tutor. They might focus instead on a subjective measure
of academic ability that may be positively correlated only
with eventual performance on university exams. For these
reasons, we did not include these data in our main anal-
ysis. Nonetheless, while interpreting our empirical results,
we use these predictive regressions (see figures 3 and 6) as
suggestive evidence of where our results might have arisen
from.
IV. Assumptions
In order to develop a test of meritocratic admissions that
can be applied to the above data, we will make a set of
assumptions using the following notation. For any pair of
individuals i and j, where i is of type g and has a value of X
equal to xg and j is of type h and has X = xh with xg ∈ Xg and
xh ∈ Xh, the notation xg ε xh will mean that applicants i and
j are identical with respect to all qualitative attributes and,
moreover, every continuously distributed component of xg is
at least ε standard deviations larger than the corresponding
component of xh. For example, if G = school type and X =
(SAT , GPA, male), then xg ε xh means that applicant i and
j are both male or both female and that SATi > SATj + εσSAT
and GPAi > GPAj + εσGPA, where σGPA and σSAT are the
standard deviation of GPA and SAT for the entire population
of applicants. We will denote by Qτ (Z|A) the τth quantile
of the random variable Z given the random variable A.
Throughout the rest of the paper, we maintain the follow-
ing assumption:
Assumption M (median restriction). (i) There exists ε > 0
such that for any e ≥ ε, if xg ∈ Xg and xh ∈ Xh and
xg e xh, then,
Median
[
Z|X = xg, G = g
]
≥ Median [Z|X = xh, G = h] ,
for any g and h; (ii) φ (Xi, Gi, Zi), introduced just before
equation (1), is continuously distributed conditionally on
any realization of (Xi, Gi).
A stronger version of assumption M is first-order stochas-
tic dominance, which has the same intuitive interpretation as
assumption M:
Assumption SD (stochastic dominance). There exists ε >
0 such that for any e ≥ ε, if xg ∈ Xg and xh ∈ Xh
with xg e xh, then the distribution of Z conditional on
X = xg, G = g first-order stochastic dominates that of Z
conditional on X = xh, G = h,
Pr[Z ≤ a|X = xg, G = g] ≤ Pr[Z ≤ a|X = xh, G = h],
for any a and for all g, h; (ii) φ (Xi, Gi, Zi) is continuously
distributed conditionally on any realization of (Xi, Gi).
Crudely speaking, assumption M/SD means that appli-
cants who are better along standard, observable indicators
of academic ability are also likely to be better “on aver-
age” in terms of the index of unobserved characteristics
that the tutors weigh positively in determining admissions.
The motivation for this assumption comes from the fact that
for meritocratic admissions, the outcome of interest may be
thought of as a measure of future academic performance,
whereas the measures in X are a set of past academic perfor-
mance in high school or admissions-related assessments. It is
therefore likely that candidates who have performed signifi-
cantly better in past assessments are statistically more likely
to have performed better in those assessments (unobserved
by the researcher) that admission tutors view as positive
determinants of future performance and, hence, under the
assumption of being academically motivated, would weigh
positively on the decision to admit. While assumption M/SD
is likely to hold for the population of all students, some
of this positive dependence may be partially eroded for the
population of applicants if the decision to apply depends on
unobservables. Indeed, if applications are costly and a stu-
dent applies despite having low scores on observable tests,
she is likely to be stronger on unobservable attributes relative
to the average student with low observable test scores in the
population. Such selective application will reduce the extent
of positive dependence between observables and unobserv-
ables among the applicants relative to that in the population
of all students. We address this concern by providing evi-
dence strongly suggesting that the aggregate impact of such
“erosion” on the positive dependence is likely insignificant.
The magnitude of ε controls the strength of assumption M.
Thus, ε = 0 corresponds to the benchmark case where we
are comparing a pair of g- and h-type applicants, such that
the former has scored higher in each previous assessment
than the latter. A strictly positive ε leads to comparison of
applicant pairs with no overlap of preadmission test scores.
The higher is ε, the more likely are assumptions M or SD
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to hold, but the lower will be the power of our test, since
fewer pairs of students will satisfy M/SD with a higher ε. A
practical method for choosing ε in an application is suggested
below.
Note also that assumption M is substantively much weaker
than two informal arguments often used in applied work: (a)
when the distribution of the observable covariates is balanced
across treatment and control groups in quasi-experimental
designs, it is taken to imply that they are also balanced in
terms of unobservables (Greenstone & Gayer, 2009), and (b)
orthogonality of an instrument with observed covariates is
taken as suggestive evidence that it is orthogonal with unob-
served covariates (Angrist & Evans, 1998). In our context,
the types of variables typically unobservable to researchers
but likely to affect admissions include achievements such as
winning special academic prizes, participation in science or
math olympiads, high intellectual enthusiasm conveyed by
applicants’ personal essays, and the subjective impressions
of previous teachers implied in recommendation letters. Such
specific information can identify individual applicants and
therefore are most likely to be withheld from researchers
owing to privacy considerations. However, while making
admission decisions, tutors are likely to observe these char-
acteristics for current applicants through their application
materials or through personal interactions. It is intuitive
that such achievements are statistically more likely to have
occurred for individuals who score higher in terms of eas-
ily observable entrance assessments and aptitude tests than
those who score lower.
Finally, the continuity condition in assumption M(ii) rules
out gaps in the distribution of Z , which helps to relate the
probability of admission to the admission thresholds. Such
continuity is intuitive, especially when Z is a function of sev-
eral underlying performance indicators that are themselves
continuously distributed.
Remark 2. Note that assumption M/SD does not say that
applicants with higher X have higher Z with probability 1;
it simply says that their values of Z tend to be higher in a
stochastic sense.
Remark 3. The restriction on the median cannot be
replaced by a restriction on the conditional expectation for
identification purpose since we are considering a discrete
choice problem: D = 1{φ (X, G, Z) ≥ γG}. See Manski
(1988) for why a conditional quantile restriction is necessary
for the identification of discrete-choice models.
Remark 4. Assumption M allows the distribution of the
unobservable Z to differ by background variables. In partic-
ular, we allow both the location and the scale of Z to depend
on G (conditional on X) and thus also allow for the realis-
tic situation of larger uncertainty regarding applicants from
historically underrepresented communities.
A. Empirical Evidence of Median Dominance
Among the preadmission variables that we observe in our
data set, only the score on the interview is assigned by tutors.
This is the type of variable most likely to be missing in
other data sets since they reflect subjective assessment by
the admission tutors. We will first check our assumption
M for the applicants in our data by treating the interview
score as the unobservable component. That is, we will ver-
ify whether the median interview score is higher for those
types of applicants who are better in terms of all other “tutor-
independent” test scores X obtained in prior assessments.
If applications are costly, a student with low scores on X
will apply only if her potential performance on the inter-
view is likely to be high, so that an applicant with low X is
likely to be stronger on interview skills relative to the aver-
age student with low X. The question is whether this negative
relationship is strong enough to override the overall positive
relationship in the population. Since the interview score is
observed for the entire sample, we can test this hypothesis.4
The concrete steps leading to our test are as follows. Con-
sider X =(GCSEscore, Aptitude_test_score, Exam_essay).
First, run a median regression of interview score (which now
plays the role of Z) on X and quadratics in components of X
plus G, where G represents gender or school type, and com-
pute the predicted values. These represent Median[Z|X, G].
We then compare these predicted values for pairs of appli-
cants where the first applicant is of type G = g and the
second applicant is of type G = h. In figure 1, we depict
histograms capturing the marginal distribution of the con-
ditional median differences for different combinations of g
and h. The analog of our assumption M here is that these
histograms should have an entirely positive support, up to
estimation error. For example, the histogram in the top-left
panel of figure 1 shows the estimated marginal distribution
of the variable,
Median[interview | Xg, g = male]
− Median[interview | Xh, h = female],
across all paired realizations
(
Xg, Xh
)
satisfying Xg ε Xh.
We choose ε = 0.0. If we demonstrate median dominance for
ε = 0.0, then dominance will obviously hold for all higher
values of ε.
It is evident that all four of these histograms have entirely
positive support, suggesting that the median dominance con-
ditions hold even for ε = 0. In the online appendix, we also
show analogous histograms for the 25th and 75th quantiles
with ε = 0.0. There is overwhelming evidence that these his-
tograms also have positive support and thus that the stronger
SD condition is also likely to be true. As a second piece of
4 Since we use only applicants who were summoned for interview, there
is an additional level of selection that can further weaken the correlation
between unobservables and observables. Our “test” therefore assesses the
extent of correlation remaining after both levels of selection.
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Figure 1.—Evidence of Median Dominance
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Histogram of differences in predicted median interview score across pairs of candidates where the first has scored higher than the second in terms of each of GCSE score, aptitude test, and essay. For example, the
histogram in the top-left panel shows the estimated marginal distribution of the variable: Median[interview | Xmale,G = male] – Median[interview | Xfemale,G = female] across all paired realizations (Xmale,Xfemale)
satisfying Xmale ≥ Xfemale.
evidence, we calculate the correlation matrix among the var-
ious indicators of academic merit at the preadmission stage.
These are reported in the online appendix, where it is evident
that all correlations are strictly positive, which lends further
support to assumption M/SD.
The evidence presented is of course suggestive rather than
definitive. Indeed, if we had found a negative or no relation
between the interview score and the observable test scores,
our assumption M would be suspect. The point of figure 1
in the text and figures 8 and 9 and table 5 in the appendix is
to show that this is not the case.
Our next assumption relates to the structure of the φ
function.
Assumption CM (conditional monotonicity). (i) φ (x, g, z)
is strictly increasing in z for every x and g; (ii) if xg and
xh satisfy xg ε xh, then φ
(
xg, g, z
)
> φ (xh, h, z) for any
z, and any g = h.
Part i of assumption CM is essentially definitional (regard-
ing Z) in that higher values of the index of ability based on
unobserved characteristics are associated with higher val-
ues of the perceived expected outcome. Part ii says that if
a g-type applicant is better than an h-type applicant along a
set of key observable characteristics and is at least equally
good along the ability index, which is unobservable to us
but observable to the decision makers, then the g-type appli-
cant will be perceived to have a higher expected outcome
by the decision maker. It is important for part ii that the g-
type applicant is at least as good as the h-type applicant along
the index Z . For instance, suppose that admission tutors base
their assessment on past exams whose scores X are observed
by us and the quality of the reference letter Z , unobserved
by us. Then a female candidate who has scored lower on
every component of X than a male candidate but has a much
better recommendation may or may not be perceived as hav-
ing lower potential than the male candidate. But a female
candidate who has an equally strong recommendation Z as
a male candidate but has scored lower on every X than he
did will likely be perceived to have lower academic potential
in expectation. A sufficient but not necessary condition for
CM (ii) to hold is that (a) φ (x, g, z) = φ (x, h, z) ≡ φ (x, z)
for all x, z for any g = h (i.e., conditional on the observ-
able X and unobservable Z , the demographic characteristic
G does not affect the outcome of interest), and, furthermore,
(b) φ (x, z) ≥ φ (x′, z) if x ε x′.
As a referee has pointed out, there is some evidence from
California that women with lower SAT scores and high
school GPA than men have performed systematically better
in college examinations (Leonard & Jiang, 1999; Rothstein,
2004). This does seem somewhat unlikely in our applica-
tion, given figures 1 and figure 3 below. Nonetheless, for the
sake of robustness in our empirical application, we consider
a variant of assumption CM where instead of the raw scores
Xg and Xh, we use their standardized versions. That is, for
group g, each performance measure Xg is taken not to be the
raw score but as Xcong ≡
(
raw_score − μg
)
/σg, where μg
and σg are the mean and standard deviation of the raw score
within group g. Accordingly, the condition Xconmale δ Xconfemale
refers to male-female pairs where the males have higher
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relative scores than females: Xmale−μmale
σmale
≥ Xfemale−μfemale
σfemale + δ.
Then the contextual version of assumption CM (ii) is given
by:
Assumption CM’ (conditional contextual monotonicity).
(i) φ (X , g, z) ≡ φ (Xcon, g, z), for all g, z; the func-
tion φ (xcon, g, z) is strictly increasing in z for every xcon
and g.5 (ii) If xcong and xconh satisfy xcong δ xconh , then
φ
(
xcong , g, z
)
> φ
(
xconh , h, z
)
for any z, and any g = h.
This assumption means that candidates whose perfor-
mances are in the top echelons of their own sociodemo-
graphic group will be perceived to be academically stronger.
It thus allows for biased performance measures—for exam-
ple, that female applicants with lower raw scores on preentry
evaluations may perform better on college exams, on aver-
age, and may therefore be favored by admission officers over
men with higher initial scores. In our empirical work, we will
report the results using both the raw and the standardized
scores to compare pairs of applicants.
Choice of ε. A practical way of choosing ε is to draw
histograms based on observables like figure 1 for a range of
values of ε and then choose the smallest value for which the
corresponding histograms have entirely positive support. In
the application discussed below, we report results for ε = 0.1
and ε = 0.25 to ensure that there is no overlap in observ-
able characteristics between the pairs of students compared.
Indeed, from figure 1, it is obvious that any value of ε larger
than 0 should be acceptable for this application. We also
provide some robustness check by reporting results over a
range of ε in figure 7.
B. Identification Analysis
We show how assumptions M/SD and CM can be used to
identify the sign of threshold differences. To see this, denote
the threshold used for type g and type h applicants by γg and
γh, respectively. Under meritocratic admissions, one expects
γg = γh. Define the function
p (x, g) : = Pr [D = 1|X = x, G = g]
: = Pr [φ (X, G, Z) > γg|X = xg, G = g],
and the set M (g, h, ε) as
M(g, h, ε) : = { (xg, xh) ∈ Xg × Xh : xg ε xh, p (xg, g)
≤ 0.5 < p (xh, h)
}
. (2)
Note that the set M (g, h, ε) can be directly computed from
the data because it depends only on observables.
5 Part i of this assumption is identical to CM(i), since one can always
rewrite φ (x, g, z) = φ (μg + σgxcon, g, z) ≡ ξ (xcon, g, z) with the mono-
tonicity of φ (x, g, z) in x carrying over to monotonicity of ξ (xcon, g, z) in
xcon.
Now suppose that one finds that M (g, h, ε) is nonempty.
Then, for any
(
xg, xh
)
in M (g, h, ε), since p (xg, g) =
Pr
[
φ
(
xg, g, Z
)
> γg|xg, g
] ≤ 0.5, it must be true that
γg ≥ Median
[
φ (X, G, Z) |X = xg, G = g
]
= φ (xg, g, Median [Z|xg, g]), by assumption CM(i)
> φ
(
xh, h, Median
[
Z|xg, g
])
, by CM(ii)
≥ φ (xh, h, Median [Z|xh, h]), by assumption M
= Median [φ (X, G, Z) |X = xh, G = h], by CM(i)
≥ γh, since 0.5 < p (xh, h) .
Thus, the nonemptiness of the set M (g, h, ε) leads to the
inequality γg > γh.
Under the stronger SD assumption, nonemptiness of the
set
SD(g, h, ε) := { (xg, xh) ∈ Xg × Xh : xg ε xh, p (xg, g)
< p (xh, h)
} (3)
would analogously imply that γg > γh. This is because
if
(
xg, xh
) ∈SD (g, h, ε), then because 1 − p (xg, g) =
Pr
{
φ (X, G, Z) < γg|X = xg, G = g
}
, we have that
γg = Q1−p(xg,g)
[
φ (X, G, Z) |X = xg, G = g
]
= φ
(
xg, g, Q1−p(xg,g)
[
Z|xg, g
])
, since φ
(
xg, g, ·
)
is increasing
> φ
(
xg, g, Q1−p(xh,h)
[
Z|xg, g
])
,
since p
(
xg, g
)
< p (xh, h)
≥ φ (xg, g, Q1−p(xh,h) [Z|xh, h]), by assumption SD
since xg ε xh
≥ φ (xh, h, Q1−p(xh,h) [Z|xh, h]), by assumption CM(ii)
since xg ε xh
= Q1−p(xh,h) {φ (xh, h, Z) |xh, h}, since φ (xh, h, ·)
is increasing
≥ γh,
since
1 − p (xh, h) = Pr {φ (X, G, Z) < γh|X = xh, G = h}.
Intuitively speaking, here the identification-relevant infor-
mation comes from those pairs of g-type and h-type appli-
cants for whom the dominance condition xg ε xh holds
and yet the g-type’s probability of being accepted is lower.
Assumption M (or SD) guarantees that these g-type appli-
cants are also better, in a stochastic sense, in terms of
unobservables. Note that these identifying pairs include
applicants who are close to each other (albeit at least ε stan-
dard deviations apart) in terms of observables and also those
that are further apart. Also when γg − γh > 0, it must be
the case that SD (h, g, ε) is empty. Therefore, if one finds
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that SD (g, h, ε) is empty, then one may test if SD (h, g, ε)
is nonempty. If so, then one can conclude that γg < γh.
Remark 5. The logical structure of our analysis is that if
SSD (g, h, ε) is nonempty, then we can conclude that γg > γh.
But it is possible that although γg > γh, we find that
SSD (g, h, ε) is empty. This is a generic feature of any analy-
sis based on partially identified parameters: they must be
conclusive in fewer instances compared to when model
parameters are point identified. In other words, the cost of
allowing for unobservables is that we may lose the ability to
detect very small but positive threshold differences, but when
we detect a difference, we can be certain about its existence.
Indeed, without our proposed methods and the underlying
assumptions justifying them, one cannot in general detect
any threshold difference however large they might be.
C. Alternative Identification Strategies
Our methodology may be contrasted with some alterna-
tive strategies proposed in the literature in noneducational
contexts. For instance, in the context of health care, Chandra
and Staiger (2009) attempt to identify differences in expected
outcome thresholds for surgery by assuming an index restric-
tion on the unobservable’s distribution. This approach fails
when the distribution of the unobservables differs across
G, conditional on observables. Our analysis imposes no
such restriction on the unobservables’ distribution. In the
health care context, Bhattacharya (2013) suggests an alter-
native approach to testing treatment bias using a combination
of observational data and prior experimental findings from
randomized controlled trials. Such experimental data are dif-
ficult to come by for college admissions. In law enforcement
contexts, several researchers have relied on the assumption
that target individuals react optimally to treatment proto-
cols and devised methods to detect racial prejudice using
this (Persico, 2009). However, these approaches rely on the
specifics of the context and do not generalize to situations
involving university admissions. For example, it is both diffi-
cult for university applicants to alter their potential academic
outcomes in response to admission protocols and impracti-
cal for them to want to do this given the one-shot nature of
admission exercise.
V. Estimation and Inference
Given the identification analysis, our next task is to
develop a formal inference method for testing threshold
differences. For this purpose, we will make the stronger
assumption of SD rather than M. Indeed, these two assump-
tions have the same intuitive interpretation; the evidence
for SD (see section VI and also part B of the appendix)
is strong, and conducting statistical inference under it is
slightly simpler.
The key task regarding inference, corresponding to
assumptions SD and CM, is to test whether SD (g, h, ε),
defined in equation (3),
SD(g, h, ε) : = { (xg, xh) ∈ Xg × Xh : xg ε xh, p (xg, g)
< p (xh, h)
}
is nonempty. Observe that the null hypothesis of an empty
SD (g, h, ε) is equivalent to the hypothesis that α0 ≥ 0,
where
α0 : = inf
(xg,xh)∈Xg×Xh, xgεxh
[
p
(
xg, g
) − p (xh, h)] .
We will now outline how to test the emptiness of
SD (g, h, ε), based on an inference method developed for
“intersection bounds” by Chernozhukov, Lee, and Rosen
(2013, hereafter, CLR). Although our identification method
is nonparametric in the sense of not requiring functional
form specifications, estimation and inference for the non-
parametric case are complicated. Due to relatively small
sample size, the two-sample nature of the problem, and the
complicated construction of intersection bounds for non-
parametric estimates (requiring subjective choice of various
tuning parameters), we do not consider such methods here.
Instead, we focus on the case where p (·, ·) is parametrically
specified as a probit, that is,
p
(
xg, g
) = Pr [D = 1| (X, G) = (xg, g)] = Φ (x′gδ0,g) ;
and p (xh, h) = Φ
(
x′hδ0,h
)
,
where (δ0,g, δ0,h) are the probit coefficients and Φ is the CDF
of the standard normal. Note that under our parametric spec-
ification, Φ(x′gδg) ≤ Φ(x′hδh) is equivalent to x′gδg ≤ x′hδh
and thus
SD (g, h, ε) = {xg ε xh, x′gδ0,g ≤ x′hδ0,h} ,
and thus emptiness of SD (g, h, ε) is equivalent to the
hypothesis that θ0 ≥ 0, where
θ0 : = inf
(xg,xh)∈Xg×Xh, xgεxh
[
x′gδ0,g − x′hδ0,h
]
.
The quantity θ0 is exactly of the form analyzed in CLR
(2013). We construct a one-sided 95% confidence interval
ˆCn (0.95) =
(−∞, ˆθn0 (0.95)) for θ0 by adapting the CLR
method, as outlined in part C of the appendix, for each
choice of g and h. If ˆθn0 (0.95) < 0, then we conclude that
SD (g, h, ε) is nonempty.
VI. Empirical Analysis
We provide summary statistics for our sample in table
2. The left half of table 1 shows that male applicants have
better aptitude test scores and interview averages. They per-
form slightly worse on average in their GCSE and A-levels.
These differences are statistically significant at the 5% level.
Note that there is no significant difference in offer rates
between male and female candidates. The independent and
state school applicants are quite similar in terms of most
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Table 2.—Means by Gender and School Type
Female (N = 241) Male (N = 394) pvalue_diff State (N = 355) Independent (N = 280) pvalue_diff
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
gcsescore 3.79 3.72 0 3.67 3.85 0
alevelscore 119.73 119.59 0.01 119.60 119.73 0.02
aptitude test 62.02 65.09 0 63.16 64.85 0.0015
essay 61.77 63.38 0 62.98 64.42 0.5
interview 63.74 64.69 0.04 64.24 64.43 0.65
prelim_avg 61.02 62.33 0.04 61.83 61.83 0.03
offer 0.33 0.37 0.14 0.34 0.35 0.24
accept 0.33 0.37 0.5 0.34 0.35 0.46
The data pertain to two cohorts of applicants. The variable names are explained in table 1. Columns 3 and 6 record the p-value corresponding to a test of equal means against a one-sided alternative. Differences in
unconditional offer rates across school types (highlighted) are seen to be statistically indistinguishable from 0 at 5%.
Table 3.—Probit Regression of Admission
Coefficient/ Marginal Marginal
Variable Coefficient SE Effect Effect/SE
gcsescore 0.188 0.76 0.055 0.75
interview 0.225 10.43 0.066 11.72
aptitude test 0.087 6.99 0.026 6.76
essay 0.007 0.59 0.002 0.59
male −0.210 −1.33 0.062 −1.31
independent −0.129 −0.84 0.037 −0.84
Probit regression of eventual admission for all U.K.-based applicants, together with two-sided p-value.
The highlighted fields show insignificant effect of gender and school background on admission probabilities,
controlling for aptitude test scores. Data pertain to two cohorts of U.K.-based applicants. Marginal effects
are calculated at mean values of covariates and for moving from 0 to 1 for male and independent. Gender
and school type remain insignificant (highlighted in italics) even after controlling for past test-scores.
characteristics except for a slightly higher GCSE for the
former.
In table 3, we report the results of a probit regression of
receiving an offer across all applicants. Table 3 strength-
ens the findings from table 2 by showing that even after
controlling for covariates, gender and school type do not
affect the average admission success rate among applicants.
The value of McFadden’s pseudo-R2 for the probit model
is about 50%, and the corresponding R2 for a linear prob-
ability model (not reported here) is about 45%, about ten
times higher than the goodness-of-fit measures typically
reported by applied researchers working with cross-sectional
data. This suggests that the commonly observed covariates
explain a very large fraction of admission outcomes. More-
over, table 3 also shows that the aptitude test and interview
scores have the largest impact upon receiving an offer for
the applicant population (in terms of the t-statistics).
A. Results
We first conducted a simulation exercise, reported in the
online appendix, part B.3, using these data, to check if our
methods work well in a setting where we “know” the true
admission criteria. In that exercise, we find that medium-
sized differences in admission thresholds are picked up
by our method and very small differences are not, which
increases our confidence that the methods work well in prac-
tice. Now we turn to the real application where we use the
gcsescore, aptitude test score, and the interview score as the
covariates X for defining dominance. That is, if a g-type
candidate has scored ε standard deviations higher on each of
these three key assessment scores than an h-type candidate,
then the conditional distribution (or median) of the unobserv-
able component of assessment for the former is assumed to
dominate that for the latter for all g and h, as per assumption
M or SD.
In accordance with the discussion in section V, the first
step is to examine the emptiness of SD (g, h, ε) using data
on only X and D. We first investigate this graphically in
figure 2 by plotting the marginal CDF of the difference
in admission probabilities p
(
Xg, g
) − p (Xh, h) for pairs of(
Xg, Xh
)
satisfying Xg ε Xh for ε = 0.1 for various combi-
nations of g and h. The predicted probabilities p (·, ·) are
calculated separately for each group g via standard pro-
bit using gcsescore, aptitude test score, the examination
essay score, and the interview score as regressors. Since
we concluded dominance with ε = 0.0, with Z being
the interview score, we chose a slightly higher (i.e., more
conservative) value of ε = 0.1 to investigate the empti-
ness of SD (g, h, ε). When the event {Xg ε Xh} happens
with positive probability, an empty SD (g, h, ε) is equiv-
alent to Pr
[
Xg ε Xh, p
(
Xg, g
)
< p (Xh, h)
] = 0, where
the probability is taken with respect to the distributions
of Xg and Xh. Therefore, a positive mass at and below 0
for these CDFs indicates that SD (g, h, ε) is nonempty. In
the left panel, when g = male, h = female, the CDF
is represented by the solid curve, labeled male_fem, and
when g = female and h = male, it is the dashed curve,
labeled fem_male. A positive height at 0 indicates that appli-
cants with higher observables in the first group have lower
admission probabilities than the second.
Clearly the first curve has significant mass below 0 and
the dashed curve has almost no mass below 0, suggesting a
positive probability that p (Xmale, male) < p
(
Xfemale, female
)
although Xmale ε Xfemale. This evidence is still present in
the right panel, with independent and state schools replac-
ing male and female, respectively, but to a slightly lesser
extent, suggesting that γindep may be only slightly larger
than γstate. To perform the test formally, in table 4, we report
ˆθ0n (0.95), the upper limit of a one-sided confidence inter-
val, calculated using the method of CLR, as explained in
section V. We report results for ε = 0.1 (recall that we con-
cluded dominance even with ε = 0; see figure 2). A negative
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Figure 2.—Graphical Evidence of Different Admission Thresholds
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The graphs plot the marginal CDF of the difference in admission probabilities p(Xg, g) − p(Xh, h) for pairs of (Xg, Xh) satisfying Xg > ε Xh for ε = 0.1 for various combinations of g and h. A positive height at 0
indicates that applicants with higher observables in the first group (g) have lower admission probabilities than those with lower observables in the second group (h). The solid curve on the left panel shows, for example,
that a subgroup of men with higher observables have a lower admission probability than a subgroup of women with lower observables.
Table 4.—Testing Unequal Thresholds
Quadratics in Standardized
Preadmission Scores, Scores,
Difference ε = 0.1 ε = 0.25 ε = 0.1 δ = 1.5
g = male, h = female −1.73 −2.02 −3.49 −2.01
g = female, h = male 0.57 0.67 0.684 0.43
g = indep, h = state −1.29 −0.58 −2.75 0.012
g = state, h = indep 0.92 0.04 0.635 1.87
g = state_male, h = state_female −1.36 −1.01 −6.85 −1.19
g = indep_male, h = indep_female −1.11 −3.39 −2.7 −3.56
This table reports the upper limit of the one-sided 95% confidence interval for testing whether group g is facing a higher admission threshold than group h, with a negative upper limit indicating that it is. The first
two columns (with ε = 0.1 and ε = 0.25) correspond to evaluating difference in admission probability (as a function of gcsescore, aptitude test score, essay score, and interview score) between a g-type and an h-type
applicant where the former has scored ε standard deviations higher on each of the raw preentry performance measures, and the final column corresponds to the case where the former has scored 1.5 points or higher on
standardized Z-score versions of them, as explained in the text in section 6.2a. The penultimate column shows the results when qudratics and second-order interactions between all preadmission performance measures
are used as additional controls, beyond the linear versions of them, to predict admission probabilities, as a robustness check.
upper limit indicates that the set SD (g, h, ε) is nonempty;
consequently, we reject the null of γg ≤ γh in favor of
γg > γh. It is evident from the first four rows of table 4 that
we reject emptiness for g = male, h = female and for g =
indep, h = state but not in the other cases. This suggests that
males and private school applicants face higher admission
thresholds. The exact upper limits of confidence intervals
reported vary slightly across functional specifications—for
example, whether higher-order terms and interactions in the
test scores are or are not used to estimate p (·, ·))—but two
empirical findings are robust across all specifications: (a)
the gender gap is large, persistent, and statistically signif-
icant in every case,6 and (b) the independent–state school
6 As noted by a referee, this finding is somewhat curious, given that
girls routinely outperform boys in the majority of high school and col-
lege tests across the world, including the PISA assessments (Goldin, Katz,
& Kuziemko, 2006, and Niederle & Vesterlund, 2010). Indeed in our data,
the performance of the average (as opposed to marginal) female admit is
also lower than that of the average male admit, although this has nothing to
do with admission thresholds and fair admission per se.
difference is less persistent across specifications but is
always negative. Given the evidence of a large gender gap,
we investigated it further by breaking the data up by school
type. Results reported in the last two rows of table 4 show
that the gender gap is large within both state and private
school categories, indicating that male applicants are held to
a higher standard for applicants from both state and private
school backgrounds.
It would be natural to conjecture that the threshold differ-
ences arise primarily from the implicit or explicit practice
of affirmative action on the overweighting of outcomes for
historically disadvantaged groups. A second possibility is
that in face of political or media pressure, admission tutors
try to equate an application success rate for, say, men with
one for women, which is also consistent with our empirical
findings (see tables 2 and 3). This would make the effective
male threshold higher if, say, the conditional male outcome
distribution has a thicker right tail. A third possibility is that
female applicants have a lower admission threshold in order
to encourage more women to apply in the future. Note from
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Table 5.—Regression of First-Year Performance on
Observable Covariates
Coefficient SE t-value
gcsescore 3.33 1.77 1.88
aptitude test 0.19 0.04 4.31
essay −0.004 0.047 −0.08
interview 0.06 0.03 1.78
male 1.14 0.69 1.66
indep 0.41 0.68 0.75
Regression of admitted candidates’ performance on first-year examinations on preadmission test scores,
interview score, gender, and school type. Italicized fields show significant positive impact of being
male but insignificant effect of being from a private school on subsequent performance, conditional on
admission.
table 2 that the number of female applications is nearly half
the number of male ones. Regardless of what the underlying
determinants of the tutors’ behavior are, we can conclude
from our analysis that the admission practice under study
deviates from the outcome-oriented benchmark and makes
male and independent school applicants face significantly
higher admission thresholds.
In order to gain some further insight into how the thresh-
old discrepancies arise, we plot the empirical CDFs of
predicted academic performance based on the observable
characteristics. This is done by regressing first-year and then
final-year examination scores in university on gcsescore,
aptitude test and essay score, interview grades, and gen-
der or school type for enrolled students. The regression
output appears in table 5. The estimated CDFs of pre-
dicted performance by gender and school type are plotted in
figure 3B.
It is clear that in both graphs, the male distribution first-
order stochastic dominates the female distribution. This
means that if admissions were determined solely by pre-
dicted performance based on observables (i.e., there is no
unobserved heterogeneity), any common acceptance rate
across gender will result in a higher predicted outcome
for the marginal accepted male than the marginal accepted
female. The dominance is less pronounced in the case of
school type, since female independent school candidates
appear to face a lower threshold than male state school
candidates. Our results in table 4 imply that allowing for
unobserved heterogeneity does not change this scenario sub-
stantively and suggests that equating the application success
rates (see table 2) leads to the use of higher admission
thresholds for male and, to a lesser extent, private school can-
didates. Indeed, if admission officers believe that eventual
exam performance is not the relevant measure of merit, then
one needs to repeat the analysis with whichever performance
measure “meritocracy” is defined with respect to. Taking
the attainment of at least a 2.1 (a high-second-class mark of
64%), a minimum requirement for entry into most postgrad-
uate programs, the relevant outcome produces a very similar
result, presented in figure 4.
At this point, it is worth considering whether our findings
could be consistent with two other alternative explanations,
as follows.
G-blind admissions. The first possibility is where admis-
sion tutors ignore G completely in forming their assessment
and use a common admission cutoff across G, thereby gen-
erating insignificant effects of gender and school type on
admission probabilities, both unconditionally (see table 2)
and conditionally on past test scores (see table 3). Such
behavior could arise from either an institutional norm ban-
ning any conditioning on demographic characteristics or
from the tutors’ belief that such characteristics have no
explanatory power beyond the preadmission test scores.
Therefore, the question is whether by including G in our
analysis, we are detecting threshold differences that are not
“intentional.” Even if that were the case, we would argue that
in order for admissions to be meritocratic, admission tutors
should take G into account. For example, suppose G denotes
a school type—state school students are more able than
independent school students with the same test score and
therefore perform better in postadmission exams. If tutors
ignore G, then an independent and a state school student
with identical preadmission test scores will have an equal
probability of admission, even though the state school stu-
dent is more meritorious, which would contradict the notion
of meritocratic admissions.
Biased interviews score. A second issue concerns the
use of interview scores in calculating the lower bounds.
Suppose that tutors are biased in favor of type g appli-
cants and award them higher interview scores (relative to
true performance) than type h. But as we saw in figure 1,
the interview score does appear to satisfy assumption M
(with ε = 0), which would be unlikely if one type of can-
didate was systematically awarded higher interview scores
relative to their performance in the other more “objective”
tests. For example, for g = male and h = female, if men
are awarded systematically higher interview scores, then we
would expect to see a significant mass in the negative orthant
of the top-right histogram in figure 1, which is clearly not
the case.
B. Some Robustness Checks
Biased test scores. One feature of our approach is that
we are taking the preadmission test scores as true indicators
of academic merit. However, students from privileged back-
grounds might perform well in these tests simply on account
of having being coached extensively. It is not possible to
conduct any analysis of meritocracy if no previous measure
of achievement can be taken to be accurate. Postadmission
performance is not observed for nonadmitted candidates and
thus cannot be incorporated in the analysis without strong
assumptions. Therefore, it is important to examine whether
our substantive conclusions are affected if we use contex-
tualized (i.e., standardized) scores within each demographic
group as an alternative measure of merit (figure 5). Accord-
ingly, we repeat the analysis by replacing each test score
by its standardized version and invoking assumption CM’.
ARE UNIVERSITY ADMISSIONS ACADEMICALLY FAIR? 461
Figure 3.—CDF of Actual and Predicted First-Year (Preliminary) and Third-Year (Final) Performance
A. CDFs of First-Year (left) and Final-Year (right) Performance in College for Admitted Candidates, by Gender
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B. CDFs of Predicted First-Year (Preliminary) and Third-Year (Final) Performance Based on Observables, by Gender and School Type
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(A) The male CDFs lie almost entirely to the right of the femal CDFs, with dominance more pronounced for preliminary performances. (B) CDFs for admitted candidates based on observable GCSE score, interview
performance, and aptitude test scores. The male CDFs are seen to lie almost entirely to the right of the female CDFs, implying that a common admission rate would imply that marginal male entrants will have
significantly higher expected score on first- and final-year exams.
Recall the condition Xmaleδ δ Xfemale, which refers to male-
female pairs where the males have higher relative scores than
females. Then we can conclude that group g faces a higher
threshold than group h if θ0 < 0, where
θ0 ≡ inf
(xg,xh)∈Xg×Xh, xgδxh
[
x′gδ0,g − x′hδ0,h
]
.
The results from this exercise are shown in table 4, in the last
column, “Standardized Scores,” corresponding to δ = 1.25
(the smallest δ for which histograms analogous to those in
figure 1 have positive support). As before, a negative upper
limit of the CLR confidence interval indicates that group g
faces a higher threshold than group h, since some group g
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Figure 4.—Predicted Probability of Attaining a Score of 2.1
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The graph plots the CDF of the predicted probability of getting at least a high second-class score (64%)
on first-year exams, based on aptitude test score, interview score, and GCSE score. The horizontal axis
marks the probability of getting at least a 2.1, and the vertical axis is the admission probability. A common
success rate for entry would imply a lower threshold for female and state school candidates, but with male
state school candidates facing a higher threshold than female independent school candidates. For instance,
a 30% success rate across school type and gender would imply that about 63% of female candidates from
state schools and about 75% of male private school candidates would get at least a 2.1 degree in expectation.
This figure is a robustness check on figure 3.
members with high relative test scores have a lower proba-
bility of admission than some group h members with lower
relative test scores. As is apparent from table 4, in the last
column, it still remains the case that male applicants face
a higher admission threshold than female candidates. How-
ever, the test for a threshold difference between independent
and private school students now becomes inconclusive. This
confirms the previous substantive finding that threshold dif-
ferences by school type are insignificant but the gender
differences are pronounced.
First-stage selection. In principle, we can repeat our
analysis to test meritocracy in the first-stage selection pro-
cess as well. However, the first-stage selection in our empir-
ical context is based entirely on the ranking in the aptitude
test scores; there is effectively no selection on unobservables
at this stage. In particular, all applicants are classified into
bands by their overall aptitude test score. Then private school
students in approximately the top half and state school stu-
dents in the top two-thirds are interviewed. Figure 6 presents
suggestive evidence regarding the first-stage selection of
candidates. The left panel plots the CDF of aptitude test
scores for those making it to the interview stage. The right
graph plots the CDF of predicted interview scores based on
the aptitude test score (analogous to figure 3 for the second
stage of selection). A common success rate for entry to the
interview stage would imply a lower threshold for female
and state school candidates, but with male state school can-
didates facing a higher threshold than female independent
school candidates. Thus, in fact, one sees a very similar
overall picture as in the second-stage selection (see figure 3).
Choice of ε. Finally, in figure 7, we plot the upper limits
of the CLR confidence intervals across a range of ε for both
the overall gender gap, as well as the gender gap within each
school type. The persistence of the negative upper limits in
figure 7 reinforces the conclusion that female candidates face
lower thresholds than males both on average and within each
type of school background.
C. Caveats
Several caveats apply to our methods and data. The first
is that we ignore peer effects at both the individual and the
Figure 5.—Testing Monotonicity of Median Interview Score in Contextualized Test Scores
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The graphs plot histograms of the difference in admission probabilities p(Xmale,male) – p(Xfemale, female) for pairs of (Xmale, Xfemale) satisfying Xmale > Xfemale + δ, for δ = 1.0 and δ = 1.25, where Xmale,
Xfemale are the standardized test scores observed prior to admission. The smallest δ for which these histograms have positive support is δ =1.25. We use this value of δ to do our robustness checks.
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Figure 6.—First-Stage Selection
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The graphs present suggestive evidence regarding first-stage selection of candidates. (Left) The CDF of the raw aptitude test scores for those making it to the interview stage. (Right) The CDF of predicted interview
scores based on aptitude test score and GCSE score, analogous to figure 3, which pertains to the second stage of selection. A common success rate across gender and school type for entry to the interview stage would
imply a lower threshold for female and state school candidates, but with male state school candidates facing a higher threshold than female independent school candidates.
Figure 7.—Effect of ε on Gender Gap in Admission Thresholds
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We examine how the overall male-female gap in thresholds differs by school type and how the results
are affected by one’s choice of ε. We plot upper limits of 95% CLR confidence intervals, with a negative
upper limit implying that the first group faces a higher threshold than the second. These limits are plotted
across a range of ε.
institutional levels. For example, it is possible that an appli-
cant is admitted (or rejected) because he or she is deemed to
have the potential to create positive (negative) externalities
on his or her peers’ performance. But it seems unlikely to
us that admission tutors can be confident enough in predict-
ing peer effects for this consideration to play a significant
role in admissions. Nonetheless, there remains a possibility
that some students are admitted simply because they come
from demographic groups that “fit better” with the institu-
tion, although their test scores might be lower. Indeed, if
future academic performance is an index of that fit, then
figures 3 and 5 do not support these possibilities. But of
course, the fit may be judged with respect to other indices,
and thus this caveat remains.
The second caveat pertains to the data we use. In reality,
different applicants in our context are assessed by differ-
ent tutors, each assessing a set of applications. But there
is a significant reallocation of files across tutors to ensure
that meritorious candidates are not excluded simply because
the tutor assessing their files happened to have assessed a
disproportionately large number of strong applicants. How-
ever, the reallocation of files need not be perfectly managed.
Therefore, our test should be viewed as one of meritocratic
admission at the level of the university as a whole, and devi-
ations from it should be interpreted as having arisen from
a variety of possible sources including explicit affirmative
action, inefficient reallocation of files, and systematically
incorrect beliefs of tutors.
A third possibility is that in other contexts (notably in
the United States), it has been found that women perform
better an college exams than men with the same preadmis-
sion test scores. If that were true, admission officers may
admit female applicants who have scored relatively lower on
preadmission assessments. This is unlikely to be the case in
our application; indeed, figure 3A shows that postentry col-
lege performance of males’ first-order stochastic dominates
that of females, which is inconsistent with the explanation
of superior female performance. Moreover, figure 3B shows
that predicted college performance on the basis of observ-
ables is also stochastically higher for men, which provides
further evidence against that explanation. However, when
applying our methods to other contexts, it would be advis-
able to draw graphs analogous to figures 3A and 3B as a
preliminary check.
VII. Summary and Conclusion
This paper has proposed an empirical approach to testing,
on the basis of microdata, whether an existing admission
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protocol is meritocratic, when a researcher observes some
but not all applicant-specific information observed by admis-
sion tutors. The approach works by defining meritocratic
admissions through a threshold-crossing model and then
using admission data to learn the sign of the difference
in admission thresholds for different demographic groups.
These quantities are robust to the unobserved characteristics
problem, under an intuitive assumption about the ranking of
applicants by unobservable attributes. Applying our meth-
ods to admissions data for a selective U.K. university, we
find that admission thresholds that male applicants face are
significantly higher than for females, while those for pri-
vate school applicants are possibly slightly higher than for
state school applicants. In contrast, average admission rates
are nearly identical across gender and across school type.
These conclusions hold up to a large variety of robustness
checks, as described in section VIC. Beyond the application
to college admissions, our methods are potentially useful for
testing the fairness of other binary decisions such as loan
approval or surgery referrals, where allegations of bias are
common.
REFERENCES
Angrist, J., and W. Evans, “Children and Their Parents’ Labor Supply:
Evidence from Endogenous Variation in Family Size,” American
Economic Review 88 (1988), 450–477.
Arcidiacono, Peter, “Affirmative Action in Higher Education: How Do
Admission and Financial Aid Rules Affect Future Earnings?”
Econometrica 73 (2005), 1477–1524.
Arcidiacono, Peter, and Mike Lovenheim, “Affirmative Action and the
Quality-Fit Trade-Off,” NBER working paper 20962 (2015).
Becker, Gary, The Economics of Discrimination (Chicago: University of
Chicago Press, 1957).
Bertrand, Marianne, Remma Hanna, and Sendhil Mullainathan, “Affir-
mative Action in Education: Evidence from Engineering College
Admissions in India,” Journal of Public Economics 94:1–2 (2010),
16–29.
Bhattacharya, Debopam, “Evaluating Treatment Protocols Using Data
Combination,” Journal of Econometrics 173 (2013), 160–174.
Card, David, and Alan Krueger, “Would the Elimination of Affirmative
Action Affect Highly Qualified Minority Applicants? Evidence from
California And Texas?” Industrial and Labor Relations Review 58
(2005), 416–434.
Chandra, Amitabh, and Doug Staiger, “Identifying Provider Prejudice
in Medical Care,” Harvard University and Dartmouth College
mimeograph (2009).
Chernozhukov, Victor, Simon Lee, and Adam Rosen, “Intersection Bounds:
Estimation and Inference,” Econometrica 81 (2013), 667–737.
Espenshade, Thomas, C. Y. Chung, and J. L. Walling, “Admission
Preferences for Minority Students, Athletes, and Legacies at
Elite Universities,” Social Science Quarterly 85 (2004), 1422–
1446.
Fryer Ronald, and Glenn Loury, “Affirmative Action and Its Mythology,”
Journal of Economic Perspectives 19 (2005), 147–162.
Goldin, Claudia, Larry Katz, and Ilyana Kuziemko, “The Homecoming
of American College Women: The Reversal of the College Gender
Gap,” Journal of Economic Perspectives 20 (2006), 133–156.
Graddy, Kathleen, and Margaret Stevens, “The Impact of School Inputs on
Student Performance: An Empirical Study of Private Schools in the
United Kingdom,” Industrial and Labor Relations Review 58 (2005),
435–451.
Greenstone, Michael, and Tom Gayer, “Quasi-Experimental and Exper-
imental Approaches to Environmental Economics,” Journal of
Environmental Economics and Management 57 (2001), 21–44.
Heckman, James, “Detecting Discrimination,” Journal of Economic Per-
spectives 12 (1998), 101–116.
Herrnstein, Richard, and Charles Murray, The Bell Curve (New York: Free
Press, 1994).
Hinrichs, Peter, “The Effects of Affirmative Action Bans on College Enroll-
ment, Educational Attainment, and the Demographic Composition
of Universities,” this review 94 (2012), 712–722.
Hoxby, Caroline, “The Changing Selectivity of American Colleges,”
Journal of Economic Perspectives 23:4 (2009), 95–118.
Hurwitz, Michael, “The Impact of Legacy Status on Undergraduate Admis-
sions at Elite Colleges and Universities,” Economics of Education
Review 30 (2011), 480–492.
Kane, Thomas, “Racial and Ethnic Preference in College Admissions,” in
Christopher Jencks and Meredith Phillips, eds., The Black-White
Test Score Gap (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 1998).
Keith, Simon, R. M. Bell, A. G. Swanson, and A. P. Williams, “Effects
of Affirmative Action in Medical Schools: A Study of the Class
of 1975,” New England Journal of Medicine 313 (1985), 1519–
1525.
Leonard, David, and J. Jiang, “Gender Bias and the College Predictions
of the SATs: A Cry of Despair,” Research in Higher Education 40
(1999), 375–407.
Manski, Charles, “Identification of Binary Response Models,” Journal of
the American Statistical Association 83 (1988), 729–738.
Niederle, Muriel, and Lise Vesterlund, “Explaining the Gender Gap in
Math Test Scores: The Role of Competition,” Journal of Economic
Perspectives 24 (2010), 129–144.
Persico, Nicola, “Racial Profiling? Detecting Bias Using Statistical Evi-
dence,” Annual Review of Economics 1 (2009), 229–254.
Rothstein, Jesse, “College Performance Predictions and the SAT,” Journal
of Econometrics 121 (2004), 297–317.
Sander, Richard, “A Systemic Analysis of Affirmative Action in American
Law Schools,” Stanford Law Review 57 (2004), 367–483.
Waters, S., S. Cooper, N. Kuncel, P. R. Sackett, and J. Arneson, “Socio-
economic Status and the Relationship between the SAT and Fresh-
man GPA: An Analysis of Data from 41 Colleges and Universities”
(2009), research.collegeboard.org.
Zimdars, Anna, and Anthony Heath, “Elite Higher Education Admissions
in the Arts and Sciences: Is Cultural Capital the Key?” Sociology 4
(2009), 648–666.
This article has been cited by:
1. Thomas McGregor, Brock Smith, Samuel Wills. 2019. Measuring inequality. Oxford Review of Economic Policy 35:3, 368-395.
[Crossref]
2. Cristina Borra, Almudena Sevilla. 2019. COMPETITION FOR UNIVERSITY PLACES AND PARENTAL TIME
INVESTMENTS: EVIDENCE FROM THE UNITED KINGDOM. Economic Inquiry 57:3, 1460-1479. [Crossref]
3. Daniel Lee. 2018. Does Implicit Bias Predict Dictator Giving?. Games 9:4, 73. [Crossref]
